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Abstract— Integrity assurance of configuration data has a significant impact on microcontroller-based systems reliability. This 
is especially true when running applications driven by events which behavior is tightly coupled to this kind of data. This work 
proposes a new hybrid technique that combines hardware and software resources for detecting and recovering soft-errors in 
system configuration data. Our approach is based on the utilization of a common built-in microcontroller resource (timer) that 
works jointly with a software-based technique, which is responsible to periodically refresh the configuration data. The 
experiments demonstrate that non-destructive single event effects can be effectively mitigated with reduced overheads. Results 
show an important increase in fault coverage for SEUs and SETs, about one order of magnitude.  
Index Terms— Single Event Upset (SEU), Single Event Transient (SET), fault tolerance, soft error, radiation effects, design 
hardening.   
——————————      —————————— 
1 INTRODUCTION
ICROCONTROLLERS are key components in safe-
ty-critical and   high availability missions, because 
their programmability, performance and cost-
effectiveness. In addition, Commercial Off-The-Shelf 
electronic components (COTS) offer important capabili-
ties and benefits in the implementation of low-cost sys-
tems, and are opening new opportunities in space and 
avionic industry, such as small satellites [1] or safety sys-
tems [2]. However, COTS microcontrollers’ main draw-
back remains the low tolerance to radiation-induced ef-
fects. This fact can limit their applicability in the near 
future [3], [4] and consequently there is an increasing 
effort focused on developing new hardening techniques 
for COTS-based systems.  
Different approaches have been proposed to tackle this 
problem. Among them, hardware redundancy is the most 
usual and effective solution when is applied in qualified 
RadHard microprocessors. However, this fine-grain re-
dundancy does not fit in COTS components because the 
impossibility to modify their internal hardware. Coarse-
grain alternatives, as duplication or triplication of com-
ponents [5], have also been explored and even used in 
real systems, obtaining very good results. These ap-
proaches increase the complexity, cost and power con-
sumption; hiding the benefits of COTS components and 
limiting their use in low-cost and small systems. 
Software-based techniques also known as SIHFT 
(Software Implemented Hardware Fault Tolerance) do 
not require any modifications in the hardware of the mi-
croprocessor and they provide higher flexibility as well as 
lower development time and cost [6]. These techniques 
can detect and recover faults that are latent in the data 
inside the microprocessor (mainly in register file and 
micro-architecture registers) [14], as well as faults in the 
control flow [7]. Their main drawbacks are usually related 
to the overheads incurred in code size and performance 
degradation. 
In this context, configuration data are one of the most 
fault-sensitive bits of microcontrollers, especially in mis-
sion-critical reactive systems which are usually driven by 
events. The control flow of these programs is determined 
by diverse event sources synchronized with interrupts. 
The main algorithm is modeled by means of diverse in-
terrupt service routines (ISR) which react to the different 
external events. The use of interrupts avoids the need of a 
constantly polling loop and reduces the computational 
effort of the microprocessor. The configuration involves 
two main sets of data. Firstly, data devoted to define the 
operation of peripherals which generate or acquire the 
external events, such as timers, I/O ports, A/D convert-
ers, UARTs, etc… Secondly, data to define the behavior of 
interrupts (interrupt vectors, interrupt mask, etc…). It is 
worth noting the criticality of this configuration data set. 
For example, the corruption of the interrupt mask regis-
ters can have catastrophic consequences because some 
critical interrupt sources may be blocked or, alternatively, 
unwanted interrupts may be randomly generated. 
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Nevertheless, as far as we know, very little attention 
has been paid to the protection of configuration data of 
microcontroller peripherals and interrupts related regis-
ters. The fact that in most of the cases the configuration 
data are stored in some kind of protected memory may be 
the reason of this lack of attention. Designers have usual-
ly addressed this issue adopting as guidelines a set of 
good practices jointly with ad-hoc solutions [15].  
Among them, one of the most usual techniques is blind 
scrubbing of the whole memory contents [27], which is 
too time consuming and also stops the operation of the 
system. This strategy is not sufficient for dependable 
designs where a short recovery time is required, because 
during the normal system operation those critical config-
uration data leave the secure storage of memory and pass 
to reside in vulnerable dedicated registers. On the other 
hand, protection by means of traditional software-only 
techniques may reduce the recovery time, but also may 
produce a high waste of resources due to the long (or 
unlimited) lifetime of configuration data. 
In this work, we propose a hybrid technique that lev-
erages the advantages of SIHFT and self-scrubbing tech-
niques. It is aimed to the soft error mitigation in the sys-
tem configuration data, and especially focused on inter-
rupt-driven applications. The proposal is based on the 
utilization of a common built-in COTS microcontroller 
resource (timer) that works jointly with a software-based 
technique, which is responsible to periodically refresh the 
configuration data. Unlike usual scrubbing approaches, 
our on-line technique works on the fly without stopping 
the system. Preliminary results were presented in [24]. 
In order to assess the reliability provided by the stud-
ied approach, a fault injection campaign was carried out 
on a microcontroller using a non-intrusive tool [8]. The 
microcontroller was built around the PicoBlaze soft-core 
microprocessor [9]. 
2 MOTIVATION 
Let us assume p as the constant probability density of 
having a Single Event Upset (SEU) in a single configura-
tion bit in a given time. Thus, it is measured in 
[SEU/bit/s] (number of SEU events per bit per second). 
Let P(F(x), T) be the fault probability of a set of configura-
tion registers x having a lifetime of T seconds. It is sup-
posed that n bits of the configuration registers are critical 
such that SEUs always become a failure. The same might 
not apply to the rest of bits within a real system. 
As reported by [22], the probability of not upsetting 
during a time t can be modeled by the 0th order Poisson 
distribution. Thus, it can be expressed as: 
 
                   
 
Therefore MTTF (mean time to failure) can be calculated 
as: 
     
 
  
 
 
Real 16-bit MCU COTS-based systems running applica-
tions of some complexity usually need more than 300 
configuration bits. To highlight the importance of harden-
ing the configuration bits in an actual system, let us sup-
pose a Texas Instrument MSP430-based system (used in 
[1][23]) having the following set of configuration bits: 12-
bits ADC (36 bits), 2 UART(2 × 50 bits = 100 bits), clock 
(30 bits), four 8-bit I/O ports (32 × 4 = 128 bits), 2 timers 
(2 × 20 bits = 40 bits), Interrupt-Enable register (16 bits), 
Program Counter (PC) + Stack Pointer (SP) initial values 
(16 + 16 = 32 bits). That is, a total of 382 configuration bits. 
Assuming an actual on-orbit probability density of p = 
1.20e-4 SEU/bit-day [26], and n = 382 bits, we obtain a 
MTTF of 0.0597 years (≈ 22 days), which is an extremely 
high fault-rate for a mission-critical system. 
Among the 382 configuration bits, only faults in the PC 
and the SP registers could be detected by the watchdog 
timer in a normal system (that is, when no configuration 
bits are hardened). Therefore only about 8% (32 out of 
382) of those would be detected and corrected. Our pro-
posal is focused on the protection of the remaining 92%. 
It must be noted that this paper focuses on the protec-
tion of configuration bits, namely those which are written 
by the program itself. In fact, there are also status bits 
and, in particular, interrupt flags. These cannot be hard-
ened with the proposed technique as they are volatile, 
that is, the hardware peripheral can autonomously modi-
fy them. 
Yet the total number of such bits is about one order of 
magnitude less than configuration bits, therefore about 
ten times less frequent. Furthermore errors in most con-
figuration bits (e.g., baud rate of a UART) normally cause 
malfunctions for a long period of time until a new config-
uration is written, while errors in status bits usually gen-
erate temporary faults whose effect ends after a limited 
amount of time (e.g., a SEU in a UART interrupt flag 
causes one byte to be duplicated inside a message; after 
the end of the message, all the following messages are 
again correctly transferred). 
3 SOFT-ERROR MITIGATION IN THE SYSTEM 
CONFIGURATION DATA 
The protection of the configuration data for microcon-
troller peripherals is a must in mission-critical systems. In 
this work, we address the hardening of configuration 
registers (for example: clock configuration registers, pe-
ripheral configuration registers, and interrupt configura-
tion registers). In particular, hardening the configuration 
data of interrupts which is a mandatory issue in critical 
reactive systems.  
An application whose functionality is directed by inter-
rupt events, and which is mainly managed by means of a 
set of ISRs (Interrupt Service Routines) is known as a 
interrupt-driven application. One can identify two differ-
ent tasks when hardening this kind of applications based 
on software: the ISR-code hardening itself, and the system 
configuration hardening. 
For the first task, let us suppose the ISR-code to be a 
typical data driven routine such as a control attitude rou-
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tine running in a real-time control flight system. Tech-
niques for hardening this kind of routines have already 
been presented in [10] and, therefore, they are not within 
the scope of this paper. 
The second and most important task is the system con-
figuration hardening. A soft error in the system configura-
tion data is far more disruptive than an error occurring in 
a non-configuration register (e.g., a bit of a general pur-
pose register used in the ISR-code): the former might 
prevent a given ISR to be ever called or a full sub-system 
to be accessed (even after reboot), whereas an error in a 
general purpose register only affects program functionali-
ty occasionally. Hence, this work is aimed to the harden-
ing of the system configuration data.  
Regarding the configuration data of a system, as first 
stated in [1], two different scenarios can be studied taking 
into account the lifetime or rating access of the involved 
storage resources. Firstly, the configuration data remain 
static during the program execution. Secondly, the scenar-
io when the configuration data change dynamically 
throughout the program execution. It is worth mention-
ing that in both cases, storage resources do have infinite 
lifetime or a lifetime much higher than most other regis-
ters in the system. 
The following subsections present the proposed hard-
ening approach for each scenario.  
3.1 Static configuration hardening 
The term static refers to the contents of configuration 
registers which are never expected to change. The static 
configuration hardening addresses the protection of those 
peripheral configuration registers which remain un-
changed during the whole program execution. For in-
stance, this is the case of systems that statically configure 
their peripherals or I/O subsystems using specific con-
figuration registers, and storing  custom configuration 
words (e.g., baud rate and modulation for UARTs, acqui-
sition modes for ADCs and DACs, counting mode and 
period for timers/counters, pin direction for I/O ports).  
The proposed technique to harden the static configura-
tion data in event-driven applications is summarized in 
Fig. 1. Although this approach is mainly based on soft-
ware, it also needs a hardware timer. Briefly, the ap-
proach consists in refreshing the static configuration peri-
odically by means of an additional interrupt service rou-
tine that is triggered by a hardware timer.  
In order to maximize the fault coverage, the refreshing 
rate for the configuration data must be tuned according to 
two parameters: the expected soft error rate, and the ap-
plication interrupt rate. A high refreshing rate may im-
prove error mitigation while making the whole system 
less reactive. An optimal refreshing rate should be deter-
mined for each application taking into account these con-
siderations. 
Since only a single hardware timer is needed, regard-
less the number of configuration registers to be protected, 
the introduced overheads are negligible in terms hard-
ware resources. 
Main processing Interrupt processing 
main: 
Application  
interrupt i 
Hardening timer 
interrupt 
Setup conf.   
… ISRi: ISR refresh: 
forever: Interrupt handler Setup conf. 
wait …  
jump forever return from int. return from int. 
end   
Fig. 1. Proposed approach for static configuration hardening in 
interrupt-driven applications. 
3.2 Dynamic configuration hardening 
The second scenario for the hardening of event-driven 
applications concerns those processors or peripheral con-
figuration registers which are occasionally modified dur-
ing program execution, i.e., the configuration data is dy-
namic. For instance, an interrupt occasionally ena-
bled/disabled, a change of ADC configuration, etc. 
As in the static case, the hardening interrupt service 
routine is triggered periodically. However, the main dif-
ference with respect to the previous case is that the ISR 
triggered by the hardware timer does not know before-
hand what values to refresh into the configuration regis-
ters, as they change throughout the program execution.  
Hardening the dynamic configuration data requires the 
actions illustrated in Fig. 2. Firstly, during the main pro-
cessing is necessary to maintain redundant copies (two) 
of the configuration data (using protected regis-
ters/memory). Every time there are configuration chang-
es, the replicas have to be updated. Notice that data 
should be copied before proceeding to configure the sys-
tem. Secondly, the ISR driven by the hardware timer in-
cludes majority voters to check the configuration registers 
correctness (using the original registers and their two 
copies); and finally, it refreshes the configuration data 
accordingly. 
Next section presents a case study for both cases: hard-
ening static and dynamic system configuration of an 
event-driven application. 
  
Main processing Interrupt processing 
main: 
Application 
interrupt i 
Hardening timer 
interrupt 
Setup initial conf.   
… ISRi: ISR refresh: 
forever: Int. handler  Majority voter 
if (new conf.)       … Refresh conf.  
Replicate conf. return from int.  
Conf. update  return from int. 
end if   
jump forever   
end   
Fig. 2. Proposed approach for dynamic configuration hardening in 
interrupt-driven applications. 
4 CASE STUDY 
4.1 Experimental setup 
The microcontroller used for the experimental setup 
was built around the PicoBlaze microprocessor [9]. The 8-
bit soft-core microprocessor used in this experiment is a 
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technology-independent version, especially developed for 
this work (RTL PicoBlaze). This version is cycle accurate 
and RTL equivalent to the original PicoBlaze-3 version. 
The main features of the microprocessor are: 16 byte-
wide general-purpose data registers, byte-wide Arithme-
tic Logic Unit with CARRY and ZERO indicator flags, 64-
byte internal scratchpad RAM, 256 input and 256 output 
ports, 31-location CALL/RETURN stack, 1 interrupt input, 
INTERRUPT ENABLE (IE) indicator flag. 
Besides the 1K instructions (10 bits) of programmable 
on-chip program store, additional features have been 
implemented externally to provide PicoBlaze with some of 
the microcontroller common resources: 1 interrupt con-
troller (int_ctlr), 2 timers (timer0 and timer1), and several 
I/O ports. In addition, an LFSR (Linear Feedback Shift 
Register) module has been included in the circuit. The 
block diagram of the circuit can be seen in Fig. 3. 
The interrupt controller (int_ctrl) is a peripheral that ex-
tends the capability of PicoBlaze to manage up to eight 
interrupt sources. It should be enabled and properly con-
figured from the software. The configuration of interrupts 
has two hierarchical levels: the Interrupt Enable (IE) flag 
which is a global enable/disable control for the micropro-
cessor interrupts, and the interrupt_mask which is an 8-bit 
register to enable/disable each interrupt line in the 
int_ctrl. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Extended Picoblaze microcontroller block diagram. 
 
Each timer can be configured to generate a system 
“tick” (interrupt) in the range of 1µs-10ms, by means of an 
8-bit register called timerX_conf (where X is equal to 0 or 
1). The interrupt signal of every peripheral is automatical-
ly cleared once the interrupt_ack has been received from 
the PicoBlaze.  
The LFSR module will be used in the second part of 
this case study. It generates a bit sequence that will be 
responsible to emulate dynamic changes to the interrupt 
controller configuration.  
This case study comprises two parts. The first one is fo-
cused on a scenario for the static configuration case, 
whereas the second part presents a dynamic configura-
tion scenario.  
 
Static configuration scenario 
Using the resources described above, a critical reactive 
application has been developed, namely a Real Time Clock 
(RTC). In this application, configuration registers remain 
unchanged during program execution, so it has a static 
configuration with infinite lifetime.  
Fig. 4 presents the flowchart of this application. Hereaf-
ter, this version will be called non-hardened static RTC. 
This is a typical interrupt-driven application, where the 
main processing is only responsible for the configuration 
of the microcontroller and its peripherals. The RTC appli-
cation logic is implemented by the “Interrupt handler RTC” 
procedure within the ISR. Configuration data for this 
application is comprised of the following registers: IE flag, 
interrupt_mask (int_ctrl), and timer0_conf.  
According to our proposal, Fig. 5 shows the flowchart 
of the hardened static RTC application. The hardening 
strategy is hybrid. On the hardware side, an additional 
timer (timer1) is used; whereas on the software side, three 
transformations have been applied to the original code. 
Transformation 1 is responsible for the new peripheral 
configuration. Firstly, the interrupt controller is config-
ured with a new value for the interrupt_mask to enable 
interrupts coming from timer1 (besides those coming 
from timer0). Secondly, the “hard timer” (timer1) is con-
figured according to the required refresh configuration 
rate. 
 
Fig. 4. Flowchart describing the non-hardened static RTC application 
(main and interrupt processing).  
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Flowchart describing the hardened static RTC application.  
 
Transformation 2 does not affect the existing “Interrupt 
handler RTC”; it only appends a new handler for the “hard 
timer” interrupt. This handler sends the ACK to the inter-
rupt source and refreshes the static configuration registers 
(interrupt_mask in the int_ctrl, timer0_conf, and tim-
CPU
(RTL PicoBlaze)
OSC
Interrupt 
Controller 
(int_ctrl)
Program 
memory 
ROM
Scratchpad 
RAM
I/O Ports
Timer 0
RTC
Timer 1
Hard
Comm 
Port
ADC
Implemented microcontroller features
LFSR
Interrupt processingMain processing
INIT
RTC counters initialization
CONFIGURATION
- Enable µC interrupt (IE)
- Configure int_ctrl mask
- Configure timer0 (RTC Timer)
- Enable int_ctrl
FOREVER
Reset
ISR_start
Read interrupt lines from int_ctrl
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- Return from interrupt
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er1_conf). It is worth noting that interrupt priority is de-
fined by the designer within the code. In this case, since 
the RTC is a real time application, the “Interrupt handler 
RTC” has the highest priority. 
Finally, Transformation 3 includes an instruction to ena-
ble the microcontroller interrupt flag (IE) within the infi-
nite loop in the main process. This will not affect the main 
process, which instead of doing nothing will be refreshing 
the interrupt flag. In case a soft error affects the IE flag, it 
will recover its correct value the next time the “forever” 
loop is executed. Otherwise, if a fault disables this flag, 
future interrupts will be ignored. 
It must be noted that the additional timer used in our 
hardening approach (hard timer), can protect the static 
configuration of several peripherals simultaneously. 
 
Dynamic configuration scenario 
The experimental setup for this scenario is the same as 
in the previous case but including the LFSR module, 
which is responsible to emulate the dynamic nature of the 
system configuration. This module is connected to a Pico-
Blaze input port, and depending on every value of the 
generated sequence, it determines to enable/disable the 
interrupt controller dynamically. Fig. 6 depicts the 
flowchart of this application, which is called non-hardened 
dynamic RTC. The differences with respect to the static 
case can be seen in the main processing, specifically in the 
three emphasized blocks.  
 
 
Fig. 6. Flowchart describing the non-hardened dynamic RTC applica-
tion (main and interrupt processing).  
 
As explained in Section III.B., in this case, additionally 
to having a refreshing interrupt service routine which is 
triggered periodically (as in the static case), the protection 
for the dynamic configuration consists in maintaining 
replicated copies of the current configuration. In this way, 
configuration correctness is checked every time before 
proceeding to refresh the system configuration by means 
of a software-based majority voter.  Fig. 7 illustrates the 
flowchart describing the hardened dynamic RTC applica-
tion. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Flowchart describing the hardened dynamic RTC application.  
 
As in the static case, Transformation 1 is responsible for 
the new peripheral configuration (timer1 - Hard Timer). In 
addition, notice that the configuration should be replicat-
ed as well. In this particular case study, we replicate the 
configuration of the interrupt controller (int_ctlr). Copies 
should be stored in available memory, which can be lo-
cated externally with its own protection mechanisms. In 
the experiments, the worst case scenario was implement-
ed since copies are stored within the microprocessor reg-
ister file.  
Transformation 2 inserts replication instructions to cre-
ate copies every time the configuration changes. Note that 
replicas should be created before updating the system 
configuration because it avoids overwriting the correct 
new configuration value from the periodic refreshing ISR. 
Similarly to the static case, Transformation 3 enables the 
microcontroller interrupt flag (IE) constantly.  
Transformation 4 appends a new handler for the “hard 
timer” interrupt. This handler includes a majority voter 
procedure to detect and recover any possible data corrup-
tion in the configuration. Then, it refreshes the proper 
configuration registers. 
Although the code size overhead caused by this tech-
nique is higher than the one produced in the static case, in 
both cases these overheads are negligible compared to 
usual software-based techniques [6]. The additional code 
required to implement the proposed approach is in the 
order of 15 instructions for the static case and 34 instruc-
tions for the dynamic case, including the ISR for the hard-
timer. Unlike conventional software-based techniques, 
the proposed transformations are focused only in the 
mentioned pieces of the source code, and they are not 
applied to the entire program.   
 
4.2 SEU/SET Emulation System (AMUSE) 
Fault injection is commonly used in COTS micropro-
cessors to evaluate the error rate. A fault is injected by 
changing the contents of a register. This action can be 
triggered by software [12], interrupts [11] or breakpoints 
[13]. However, these approaches cannot be used in our 
case, because they are highly intrusive and can interfere 
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with the generation of true system events. To overcome 
these limitations, we used the AMUSE (Autonomous 
MUltilevel emulation System for Soft Error evaluation) 
emulation system [8][18][19][20][21]. 
AMUSE is an emulation-based fault injection system 
that supports SEU and SET fault injection for any ASIC 
technology. For SETs, pulses of a selected duration can be 
injected at any node in the circuit and their propagation 
analyzed across many clock cycles. Since the propagation 
of a pulse across combinational logic is delay-dependent, 
ASIC delays must be properly modeled. To this purpose, 
AMUSE uses a voltage-time quantization approach that 
accurately models dynamic delay effects, including elec-
trical masking effects [19]. Quantized rising/falling tran-
sition curves are implemented by a non-linear counter 
driven by a time quantization clock. This approach ena-
bles embedding ASIC delays into a model that can be 
synthesized and mapped into a FPGA to speed up the 
fault injection process. Furthermore, AMUSE combines a 
delay-accurate gate-level model with a fast cycle-accurate 
register transfer level model to improve performance 
without loss of accuracy [8]. Thanks to this multilevel 
scheme, very high fault injection rates are obtained and 
very large fault injection campaigns can be executed in a 
short time. 
Since our experimental setup is based on a soft-core 
microcontroller, it can be used within the FPGA-based 
fault emulation system AMUSE in order to exhaustively 
evaluate the fault coverage in real conditions. Hence, fault 
injection tests with a large number of faults can be carried 
out to obtain statistically representative reliability results.  
5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The proposed approach has been validated by fault in-
jection using the AMUSE emulation system. The extend-
ed Picoblaze microcontroller was synthesized for the 
90nm ASIC library technology provided by Synopsys 
(SAED90nm) [25]. Fault injection campaigns were per-
formed for several software versions with different inter-
rupt and refresh rates, also including the original, unpro-
tected software version. The results presented in this 
paper focus only on the evaluation of the proposed ap-
proach to harden the configuration data of microcontrol-
ler peripherals and interrupts. The SEU and SET sensitivi-
ties of the microprocessor core using partial hardware 
and software hardening have been analyzed previously in 
[16] and [17], respectively. 
For the sake of comparison, each hardened software 
version is characterized by the ratio of the refresh rate to 
the interrupt rate. We refer to this ratio as the Relative 
Refresh Rate (RRR). For instance, RRR = 1 means the 
configuration registers are refreshed on average as often 
as interrupts occur. If the configuration registers are re-
freshed several times between two interrupts, then RRR is 
greater than 1. Conversely, a RRR value smaller than 1 
means the refresh rate is smaller than the interrupt rate 
and that several interrupts may occur without refreshing 
the configuration registers. The non-hardened version is 
characterized by RRR = 0, i.e., no refresh at all. 
The refresh rate is determined by the “hard timer” con-
figuration. The interrupt service routine of the “hard 
timer” requires 64 clock cycles to execute and refresh the 
peripheral registers. A critical situation may happen 
when there is a collision between the “RTC timer” and 
the “hard timer” interrupts. For simplicity, we considered 
that a delay of 100 clock cycles in servicing the “RTC 
timer” interrupt is acceptable for the application. Thus, in 
case the “RTC timer” interrupt signal arrives while the 
“hard timer” interrupt is being serviced, the “RTC timer” 
interrupt service will be slightly delayed. Interrupt priori-
ties can be used if the “RTC timer” interrupt cannot be 
delayed. 
5.1 Static configuration results 
For the first experiments, we set the RTC interrupt rate 
to 500 clock cycles and the refresh rate to several values 
between 5000 clock cycles (RRR = 0.1) and 50 clock cycles 
(RRR = 10). The original version with no refresh (RRR = 0, 
hard timer disabled) was also included in the experi-
ments. The results for SEU and SET fault injection are 
summarized in Figs. 8 and 9, respectively.  
For each refresh rate, we run the Real Time Clock ap-
plication for 65,000 clock cycles, servicing 130 RTC inter-
rupt events. Along this time, we injected 12,534 random 
SETs and SEUs into every gate and flip-flop, respectively, 
of the peripheral circuit, which includes the timers and 
the interrupt controller. SEUs were also injected into the 
interrupt enable flag register of the microcontroller, since 
this register is critical for the peripheral operation. For 
gates, SET pulses of 500 ps were injected at random in-
stants. For flip-flops, SEUs were injected at random clock 
cycles. The total number of faults injected in each version 
was 5,414,688 faults.  
The results in Fig. 8 show that the SEU sensitivity can 
be reduced from 13.4% in the original circuit to 1.3% in 
the case of RRR = 10. As expected, the error rate reduces 
when the refresh rate increases, and the reduction is sig-
nificantly higher for RRR greater than 1. Remarkably, the 
interrupt enable flag produced no error in all hardened 
versions while it has a sensitivity of 85% in the original 
non-hardened version. The results for SETs in Fig. 9 are 
very similar, but with smaller error rates.  
In practical cases, very high error mitigation can be ob-
tained since the time between interrupts is typically much 
larger than the one we used in the experiments (500 clock 
cycles). The opportunity window for an error to appear is 
then reduced to the time between the last refresh and the 
next application interrupt, which can be made very small 
by increasing the refresh rate. 
We have also checked that errors in the hard-timer and 
errors due the execution of the hardening ISR are mostly 
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benign, because the effect in most cases is just a tempo-
rary change in the refresh rate, which is eventually cor-
rected when the ISR is executed again. For instance, the 
hardening ISR uses a single register (s0) to configure the 
refresh rate, and the SEU error sensitivity of this register 
varies from 0.37% to 0.69% when the RRR varies between 
0 and 10 respectively. This result has been obtained when 
this register is not hardened at all. These errors can be 
easily removed by software hardening of the ISR.  
 
 
Fig. 8. SEU Error Rates for static configuration and variable refresh 
rate 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9. SET Error Rates for static configuration and variable refresh 
rate 
 
In a second set of experiments, the refresh rate was set 
to the minimum feasible value of 100 clock cycles, while 
the RTC interrupt rate was varied to evaluate how the 
error rate decreases as interrupts occur less frequently. 
Fig. 10 shows the SEU error rate in this case. For RRR = 1, 
the error rate is smaller than in Fig. 8 because the refresh 
rate is higher now. For RRR higher than 25 (2500 clock 
cycles between interrupts), the error coverage is higher 
than 99%. 
 
 
 Fig. 10. SEU Error Rates for static configuration and fixed refresh 
rate  
 
5.2 Dynamic configuration results 
Figure 11 shows the results for the dynamic configuration 
case. As in the first experiment, the RTC interrupt rate was 
set to 500 clock cycles, but interrupts were randomly ena-
bled/disabled, depending on the bit sequence generated by 
the peripheral LFSR. The RRR is referred to the average 
interrupt rate. Although there is no fixed interrupt rate, the 
proposed approach is similarly effective: the higher the 
refresh rate, the higher the mitigation. 
As it can be seen, the error rate is higher than in the static 
case, but presents a similar trend reaching to an important 
decrease of errors for moderate refresh rates. 
 
Fig.11. SEU Error Rates for dynamic configuration and variable 
refresh rate  
 
An additional experiment was carried out injecting 
faults into the configuration register replicas (located in 
the microprocessor register file). Error rate did not vary 
significantly due to the software redundancy. 
A more detailed analysis of the results in both cases, 
static and dynamic, points out that only one single inter-
nal register of the interrupt controller is the source of 
more than 80% of the residual errors (those ones that are 
not mitigated using high RRR). This specific register is 
not accessible from the software and, therefore, deter-
mines the maximum fault coverage that can be achieved 
with this technique, above 99%. If this register is hard-
ened by hardware, the error rate reduces by more than 
one additional order of magnitude. 
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Regarding the overheads introduced by the technique, 
on the software side, the increase in the code size com-
prises the insertion of a few lines of code responsible to: 
rewrite the configuration data and its replicas, implement 
the voter procedure, and handle the hardening interrupt 
event. On the hardware side, the overhead only supposes 
one additional timer, regardless the number of configura-
tion data to protect. In addition, there is no performance 
overhead because the execution of the refreshing proce-
dure takes place when the main processing is not being 
executed. However, there is a possible low impact in the 
system responsiveness. This occurs only in case the hard-
ening interrupt routine is being executed when the appli-
cation interrupt arrives. This supposes to delay the sys-
tem response for the number of clock cycles until the 
hardening ISR finishes its work (in the worst case in 
terms of latency, 64 and 94 clock cycles respectively for 
the static and dynamic scenarios). Moreover, power con-
sumption overhead is a must issue to be addressed in the 
design of embedded systems with tight power budget. 
Although the repetitive execution of the refreshing rou-
tine increases the power consumption, this overhead is 
negligible for low RRR because it comprises only a few 
instructions. In case of high RRR causing excessive power 
demand, designers should always find the best trade-offs 
among RRR, fault coverage, and power to cope with the 
system requirements. 
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The use of Commercial Off-The-Shelf components in 
the implementation of low-cost safety-critical systems 
offers important benefits. However, it is necessary to 
reduce their vulnerability to radiation-induced effects, 
such as soft-errors.  This work proposes a systematic ap-
proach for soft-error mitigation that attempts to overcome 
the limitations of common ad-hoc solutions. It is focused 
on the protection of the configuration registers, which are 
the most critical resources in interrupt-driven applica-
tions. Both possible cases, static and dynamic configura-
tion, were studied.  
The technique was assessed by extensive fault injection 
campaigns for SEUs and SETs. The impact in code size 
and cost was negligible independently of the number of 
configuration registers to be protected. It is worth noting 
that a single timer can be used to protect several configu-
ration registers. The results show an important increase in 
fault coverage for SEUs and SETs, about one order of 
magnitude. From the experiments, it is deduced that the 
refresh rate and the interrupt rate are directly related in 
static and dynamic cases. Regarding the final application, 
the RRR can be used to find the best trade-off between 
reliability and system responsiveness. The proposed ap-
proach can be combined with other hardening approach-
es [10] to protect the complete microprocessor-based sys-
tem. 
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